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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the importance of specialists to the audit of significant accounting 
estimates, PCAOB inspection reports highlight instances where auditors discount advice 
received from a specialist. I examine when and why auditors discount a specialist’s 
advice. I find that auditors discount a specialist’s advice when it is evaluated at the same 
time as irrelevant advice from colleagues that consistently supports an alternate position. 
In doing so, auditors evaluate advice by applying a “consensus implies correctness” 
heuristic, instead of evaluating the advice’s relevance. I also find that when auditors first 
evaluate only irrelevant colleagues’ advice and then evaluate the specialist’s advice, they 
change their assessments to align with the specialist’s advice. Results suggest that 
separately evaluating the specialist’s advice and colleagues’ advice mitigates the effects 
of the consensus heuristic and discounting of the specialist’s advice. My results should 
be of interest to the PCAOB and public accounting firms as they revise audit guidance to 
increase reliance on specialist advice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Professional guidance emphasizes the importance of using a specialist when 
evaluating a client’s significant accounting policies and estimates (PCAOB 2003; 
IAASB 2013). Through consultation with a specialist, auditors receive advice on their 
client’s position from the firm’s designated subject-matter expert. Such advice should be 
the most relevant assessment of the client’s situation. Regardless, Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports identify cases in which 
auditors discount a specialist’s advice, thereby contributing to client restatements and 
deficient audit quality control procedures (PCAOB 2008; PCAOB 2009; PCAOB 2010a; 
PCAOB 2012). Drawing on advice utilization theory and empirics, I examine when and 
why auditors discount a specialist’s advice in the audit of significant accounting 
estimates. 
I focus on how auditors integrate advice from a specialist with advice from 
colleagues. While auditors frequently consult with specialists during the audit of 
accounting estimates, this is not the only advice that auditors solicit. Auditors also 
consult with colleagues on important audit matters (Gibbins and Emby 1985; Danos et 
al. 1989). However, colleagues’ advice may not be relevant if it is based on experience 
with clients that are not comparable to the client of the consulting auditor (Earley 2002; 
Ballou et al. 2004; Griffith et al. 2013). As such, when auditors consult both a specialist 
and colleagues, they often must integrate multiple pieces of advice that vary in 
relevance. This integration can be problematic when advice received from colleagues 
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contradicts the specialist’s advice. I theorize that the level of consensus in colleagues’ 
advice, combined with when the specialist’s advice is evaluated, influences whether 
auditors rely on the specialist’s advice or less-relevant colleagues’ advice. 
Advice that is in agreement is more influential than pieces of divergent advice. 
Budescu et al. (2003) find that perception of advice quality increases as advice 
consensus increases (see also Luan et al. 2004). Further, Harries et al. (2004) conclude 
that individuals apply a “consensus implies correctness” heuristic that subconsciously 
discounts advice that appears to be an outlier regardless of its relevance to the decision 
task. As such, inconsistent advice is discounted more heavily as consensus increases in 
the other pieces of advice. Following theory, I expect that auditors are less likely to rely 
on a specialist’s advice if it appears to be an outlier in comparison to advice received 
from colleagues.  
However, I also expect that when the specialist’s advice is evaluated, relative to 
colleagues’ advice, influences whether auditors rely on the specialist’s advice. When 
advice from the specialist is evaluated at the same time as colleagues’ advice, I expect 
that auditors will focus on the level of consensus across all pieces of advice rather than 
on the relevance of each piece of advice (Zhang et al. 2006). By focusing on consensus, 
inconsistent advice is more likely to appear to be an outlier in comparison to other pieces 
of advice. As such, when the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as 
colleagues’ advice, I expect that the specialist’s advice is discounted if it differs from 
colleagues’ advice that consistently supports an alternate position. 
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Conversely, I expect that auditors are more likely to rely on a specialist’s advice, 
regardless of whether it differs from colleagues’ advice, when the specialist’s advice is 
evaluated separately after colleagues’ advice. When auditors first evaluate only advice 
from colleagues, the colleagues’ advice is condensed into an overall assessment of 
whether the client’s preferred position is reasonable based on colleagues’ advice. When 
the specialist’s advice is subsequently evaluated, I expect that auditors re-evaluate this 
previously-made assessment, rather than compare the specialist’s advice to the level of 
consensus in colleagues’ advice. In this setting, I expect that the specialist’s advice has 
the ability to change the auditor’s previous assessment because the specialist has more 
knowledge relevant to the consultation matter (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979; Harvey and 
Fischer 1997).
1
  
I test my expectations with an experiment in which 103 Big Four audit seniors 
evaluate a client’s goodwill impairment analysis. Participants assess whether the client 
in the case should be classified as an operating or financing company. This judgment 
determines the appropriateness of the client’s valuation methodology and ultimately 
whether goodwill is potentially impaired. The client considers itself to be an operating 
company because this designation indicates that the company’s goodwill is not impaired. 
The specialist’s advice indicates that the client is a financing company and that goodwill 
is potentially impaired. I manipulate between participants the level of consensus in 
colleagues’ advice. When there is high consensus among colleagues, their advice 
                                                          
1
 As discussed in the ‘Additional Tests of Advice Utilization’ section, I perform a second experiment 
where the specialist’s advice is evaluated separately before colleagues’ advice. Results confirm the 
theoretical premise that separating the evaluation of the specialist’s advice and colleagues’ advice 
mitigates the biasing potential of consensus when advice is evaluated at the same time. 
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consistently supports a position that contradicts the specialist’s advice. Importantly, the 
colleagues’ advice is based on experience with clients that are not comparable to the 
client of the consulting auditor, making the colleagues’ advice irrelevant to the 
consultation matter. I also manipulate between participants whether the specialist’s 
advice is evaluated at the same time or after advice from colleagues.  
Results indicate that, when the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as 
consistent advice from colleagues, auditors are significantly less likely to rely on the 
specialist’s advice. More specifically, auditors are less likely to conclude that the client’s 
goodwill is potentially impaired. As expected, auditors discount the specialist’s advice 
when the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as advice from colleagues that 
consistently supports an alternate position. 
Results also indicate that, when the specialist’s advice is evaluated separately 
after evaluating colleagues’ advice, auditors change their assessments, becoming 
significantly more likely to rely on the specialist’s advice regardless of the level of 
consensus in colleagues’ advice. In this setting, auditors are more likely to conclude that 
the client’s goodwill is potentially impaired. As expected, when the auditor evaluates the 
specialist’s advice, relative to colleague’s advice, influences the auditor’s reliance on the 
specialist’s advice. 
Despite the consultative nature of the audit profession, we know very little about 
how interactions within the audit firm affect professional judgment (Nelson and Tan 
2005; Bobek et al. 2012). In practice, auditors consult with both specialists and 
colleagues on matters of audit importance. Prior studies have examined how judgment is 
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affected by consultation advice received from either a specialist or a colleague (e.g. Ng 
and Shankar 2010; Schaefer 2012; Kadous et al. 2013). While this literature has shown 
that each source influences auditor judgment, no research has studied how the auditor 
evaluates the two advice sources when they do not agree. I identify an unintended 
consequence of consultation with colleagues. Namely, my results provide evidence that 
auditors at times discount consultation advice received from the firm’s specialist when it 
differs from colleagues’ advice. This finding provides a behavioral explanation for 
survey evidence that auditors discount specialist advice that calls into question the 
reasonableness of the client’s position (Griffith 2013).  
I also identify a way to increase auditor reliance on specialist advice by 
separating the auditor’s evaluation of the specialist’s advice and colleagues’ advice. This 
finding should be of interest to the PCAOB as it contemplates how to revise professional 
guidance to address concerns identified in recent inspection reports that auditors do not 
always rely on specialist advice (PCAOB 2013). The results should also be of interest to 
public accounting firms as they revise their guidance to increase their auditors’ reliance 
on advice from designated subject-matter experts. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 With the increased use of fair-value measurements in financial statements, the 
valuation specialist’s role has become increasingly important to the audit process (Barth 
2006; Christensen et al. 2012). Valuation specialists are consulted on over eighty percent 
of audits to evaluate a wide range of financial statement accounts including financial 
instruments, goodwill and intangible assets, and pension and postretirement benefit 
liabilities (Cannon and Bedard 2013). The audit of these accounts requires significant 
professional judgment due to the high level of uncertainty inherent to the estimation 
processes (Christensen et al. 2012). Auditors also consult with colleagues on subjective 
matters of audit importance (Gibbins and Emby 1985; Danos et al. 1989). I examine how 
consultation with both a specialist and colleagues jointly affects professional judgment 
in the audit of significant accounting estimates.
2
  
Consultation with Specialists and Colleagues 
 A specialist is an audit firm’s designated subject-matter expert on a methodology 
(e.g. valuation specialists) or technical accounting topic (e.g. national office partners). 
Such specialization helps auditors better identify risk factors and indicators of 
misstatement, and appropriately adjust planned audit procedures, when working within 
their area of expertise (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Bedard and Wright 1994; Owhoso et al. 
2002; Low 2004; Hammersley 2006). Further, auditors and investors view consultation 
                                                          
2
 Prior research uses the term ‘formal consultation’ to describe the process through which an auditor 
receives advice from the audit firm’s specialist, and ‘informal consultation’ to describe the process 
through which an auditor receives advice from colleagues (e.g. Ng and Shankar 2010; Schaefer 2012; 
Kadous et al. 2013).  
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with specialists as an indicator of higher audit quality (Christensen et al. 2013). As such, 
advice received from a specialist should be the most relevant advice for the consulting 
auditor’s evaluation of the client’s preferred position. 
 Specialists are consulted during the audit of significant accounting estimates to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the client’s valuation methodology and related 
assumptions (Martin et al. 2006). However, despite the frequent use of specialists, the 
PCAOB’s 2008 and 2009 inspection reports identified 227 deficiencies in the audit of 
accounting estimates (Griffith et al. 2013). Many of these deficiencies are in the audit of 
accounts directly related to the recent financial crisis (PCAOB 2010b). Of note, reports 
for two Big Four firms highlight instances where the audit team failed to resolve 
questions raised by the valuation specialist regarding the client’s valuation methodology, 
or where the audit team accepted management’s valuation despite indicators of 
impairment identified by the valuation specialist (PCAOB 2008; PCAOB 2009; PCAOB 
2010a). Though specialists play an increasingly-important role on audits, 
communications from the PCAOB suggest that auditors sometimes discount valuation 
specialists’ advice when evaluating the reasonableness of accounting estimates.3  
In addition to specialists, auditors seek advice from colleagues on important audit 
matters (Gibbins and Emby 1985; Danos et al. 1989). Consultation with colleagues is 
generally thought to improve auditor judgment through the sharing of knowledge across 
                                                          
3
 Research providing insight into when auditors rely on specialist advice is sparse. One study concludes 
that auditors are more likely to rely on a specialist’s advice when the advice contains an explicit 
recommendation, but only if it is in contrast to a position strongly justified by the client (Ng and Shankar 
2010). Prior research has not considered how another important source of advice, colleagues, influences an 
auditor’s reliance on specialist advice.  
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engagements (Dirsmith and Covaleski 1985; Danos et al. 1989). Further, advice quality 
generally increases with the receipt of multiple pieces of advice (Ashton and Ashton 
1985). However, the advisor’s knowledge is not the only factor that determines with 
whom an auditor consults. Recent research finds that auditors are more likely to seek 
advice when the costs of consultation are lower (Schaefer 2012). To minimize these 
costs, auditors commonly seek advice from colleagues with whom they have close 
working relationships.  
Advice from these colleagues may not always be relevant to the consulting 
auditor. The AICPA’s Statement on Quality Control Standards emphasizes that effective 
consultation is only achieved when the consulted auditor has appropriate knowledge 
pertinent to the consultation (AICPA 2010). This knowledge includes an understanding 
of the accounting issue, industry practice, and client-specific factors (Danos et al. 
1989).
4
 In the audit of significant accounting estimates, colleagues’ advice may be based 
on an incomplete assessment of the accounting issue due to the division of knowledge 
that exists between the audit firm’s valuation specialist and members of the audit team 
(Martin et al. 2006; Bratten et al. 2013; Griffith et al. 2013). Further, auditors tend to 
underweight the importance of client-specific factors in comparing a client to its industry 
(Early 2002; Ballou et al. 2004). To the extent that colleagues’ advice is not based on an 
appropriate understanding of the accounting issue, industry practice, and client-specific 
                                                          
4
 The importance of client-specific knowledge is highlighted in archival research that concludes audit 
quality increases over time (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; 
Carcello and Nagy 2004). These studies posit that auditors gain client-specific knowledge through 
repeated interactions with the client. This knowledge helps auditors to better identify errors in the client’s 
accounting system. 
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factors, colleagues’ advice becomes less relevant. When this happens, colleagues’ advice 
can contradict the specialist’s advice.  
Integrating Consultation Advice 
How the auditor integrates advice from a specialist and colleagues influences the 
auditor’s assessment of the client’s position. A generally effective integration strategy is 
to weigh each piece of advice by the relevance of the advice to the decision task 
(Budescu et al. 2003; Soll and Larrick 2009). In the context of consultation advice 
received from a specialist and colleagues, the specialist has the most relevant knowledge 
given the individual’s designation as the firm’s subject-matter expert. In contrast, each 
colleague has limited knowledge from personal experience, and the experience that they 
have may be with clients that differ substantially from the client of the consulting 
auditor. Given the substantial variation in knowledge between the specialist and 
colleagues, auditors should rely on the specialist’s advice when it differs from 
colleagues’ advice (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996).  
However, I expect that the level of consensus in colleagues’ advice, combined 
with when the specialist’s advice is evaluated, influences whether the auditor relies on 
the specialist’s advice or colleagues’ advice. Consensus influences the perceived level of 
uncertainty surrounding a choice (Tanford and Penrod 1984; West and Broniarczyk 
1988). As consensus increases, individuals are more likely to rely on advice, because 
consistency makes the advice appear to be of higher quality (Budescu et al. 2003; Luan 
et al. 2004; Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). Therefore, I expect that auditors perceive advice 
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received from colleagues to be of higher quality, regardless of its relevance, as the level 
of consensus increases in colleagues’ advice. 
When the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as consistent advice 
from colleagues, auditors are likely to discount the specialist’s advice if it appears to be 
an outlier in comparison to advice received from colleagues. If all the advice is 
considered simultaneously, individuals commonly rely on consensus to evaluate 
differences in opinion across advisors (Zhang et al. 2006). In doing so, they discount an 
outlying opinion through the application of a “consensus implies correctness” heuristic 
(Harries et al. 2004, Yaniv and Milyavsky 2007).
 5
 By focusing on consensus, rather than 
the relevance of advice, auditors applying this heuristic are more likely to unconsciously 
discount contradictory advice from the specialist as the level of consensus in colleagues’ 
advice increases. As a result, if the client’s position is supported by advice received from 
colleagues that conflicts with the specialist’s advice, auditors are more likely to conclude 
that the client’s position is reasonable as the level of consensus increases in colleagues’ 
advice. Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
H1: When the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as colleagues’ 
advice, auditors are less likely to rely on specialist’s advice that differs from 
colleagues’ advice as the level of consensus increases in colleagues’ advice. 
Although I predict that the level of consensus in colleagues’ advice can bias 
auditor judgment, I also expect that the bias can be mitigated by separating the auditor’s 
                                                          
5
 The strategy is consistent with studies of group decision making where individual views tend to conform 
to the group consensus (Nemeth 1986; Mackie et al. 1990). The strategy is a biologically-reinforced 
adaptive decision rule in social settings (Henrich and Boyd 1998). 
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evaluation of the specialist’s advice and colleagues’ advice. Individuals are more likely 
to evaluate advice based on its relevance to the decision if the task is restructured to 
focus the decision maker’s assessment on the outcome rather than on the level of 
consensus across advisors (Zhang et al. 2006). Restructuring is accomplished when the 
auditor separately evaluates the client’s preferred position in light of the colleagues’ 
advice, and in light of the specialist’s advice. By changing when the specialist’s advice 
is evaluated relative to the colleague’s advice, the auditor’s focus shifts from the level of 
consensus to whether the advice received supports the client’s position.  
When the specialist’s advice is evaluated separately after colleagues’ advice, 
advice received from colleagues is first condensed into an overall assessment of whether 
the client’s preferred position is reasonable based on the advice received. When the 
auditor evaluates the specialist’s advice after the assessment made using colleague’s 
advice, the auditor re-evaluates the previously-made assessment. In doing so, the 
specialist’s advice is compared to the auditor’s previous assessment based on the 
colleagues’ advice, rather than to the level of consensus in colleagues’ advice. This 
should help auditors recognize that the specialist has greater task-relevant knowledge. 
When individuals recognize differences in relevant knowledge, they place greater 
reliance on advice received from the more knowledgeable advisor (Birnbaum and 
Stegner 1979; Harvey and Fischer 1997). As such, I expect auditors to place greater 
reliance on the specialist’s advice, regardless of consensus in colleagues’ advice, when 
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the specialist’s advice is evaluated separately after an evaluation made using colleagues’ 
advice.
6
 Accordingly, I hypothesize:   
H2: When the specialist’s advice is evaluated separately after an assessment 
made using colleagues’ advice, auditors are more likely to rely on the 
specialist’s advice regardless of the level of consensus in colleagues’ advice. 
  
                                                          
6
 This theory also predicts that auditors place greater reliance on the specialist’s advice when it is 
evaluated separately before colleagues’ advice, because they recognize in the second assessment that 
colleagues have less knowledge relevant to the consultation. Refer to the ‘Additional Tests of Advice 
Utilization’ section for an additional experiment testing this expectation. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Participants 
One hundred and three auditors attending one Big Four firm’s senior auditor 
training participated in an experiment to test the hypothesized effects of advice from a 
specialist and colleagues on professional judgment. Audit seniors actively participate in 
the decision making process when a specialist is used to audit significant accounting 
estimates, and their assessments influence the judgments of managers and partners 
(Ricchiute 1999; Griffith 2013). Personnel from the firm that provided the participants 
noted that the case realistically portrayed the audit consultation process, and commented 
that audit seniors are frequently the primary point of contact between the specialist and 
the audit team.  
Experimental Task 
 Participants complete a case in which they evaluate a client’s goodwill 
impairment analysis. At the start of the case, participants read a brief summary of the 
client’s business and the impairment assessment process prescribed by Accounting 
Standards Codification (ASC) 350-20. The client (Rail Co.) is a railcar leasing company 
that also performs fleet management services and serves as a railcar broker for a few 
select customers. The guidance indicates that a potential impairment exists if the 
calculated fair value of the reporting unit with goodwill is less than its carrying value 
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(FASB 2011).
7
 Based on the client’s reporting structure, the entire company is 
considered one reporting unit. Client management has concluded that goodwill is not 
impaired based on an analysis of projected income and expenses. The auditor in the case 
sends the client’s analysis to the firm’s valuation specialist to review the client’s 
methodology and assumptions.  
 When acknowledging receipt of the client’s analysis, the specialist notes that the 
client used an unlevered discounted cash flow approach to determine fair value. He 
explains that there is also a levered approach, and that the two approaches differ in the 
treatment of debt financing costs and interest expense. Based on a quick sensitivity 
analysis, the specialist observes that goodwill would be potentially impaired, by an 
amount in excess of performance materiality, if the client used the levered approach. He 
indicates that operating companies (e.g. manufacturers and service providers) typically 
use an unlevered approach, while financing companies (e.g. banks and lenders) typically 
use a levered approach. As such, the assessment of whether the client should be 
classified as an operating or financing company determines the appropriateness of the 
client’s valuation methodology and whether goodwill is potentially impaired.  
The specialist emphasizes that the classification decision requires professional 
judgment because there is nothing in the firm’s audit guidance or policies that directly 
informs the matter. Through subsequent discussions with the client’s controller, the 
                                                          
7
 Accounting standards indicate this quantitative analysis need only be performed if a qualitative 
assessment indicates that it is more likely than not that a potential impairment exists. Participants are told 
that the client has elected to bypass the qualitative assessment, regardless that no qualitative indicators of 
impairment exist, and proceed directly to the quantitative analysis as permitted by ASC 350-20-35B 
(FASB 2011). 
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auditor learns that management considers the client to be an operating company because 
they offer a full service lease option in which they maintain and repair the leased 
railcars. The controller acknowledges that only a few of their customers have elected the 
full service option, and indicates that they have one mechanic on call at a centrally-
located rail yard to perform maintenance and repairs on these leases. Advice from the 
specialist and colleagues provides insight into the reasonableness of the controller’s 
conclusion that the client is an operating company. 
The specialist’s advice is presented in the form of the following assessment 
contained in one of the auditor’s conversations with the specialist:  
Based on the provided information, I think that Rail Co. is a financing company. 
The vast majority of the Company’s revenue comes from one source: long-term 
leases. On most of the leases, Rail Co. has no responsibility to repair and 
maintain the railcars.   
The specialist concludes that the client’s operations are more consistent with those of a 
lender because the client’s primary business is providing customers with a source of 
capital to obtain railcars. The specialist also notes that, because only a few customers 
have elected the full service lease option, the client has no involvement with most of the 
leased railcars after the lease is executed. Based on these observations, the specialist’s 
advice is that the client should be classified as a financing company. 
The auditor in the case also seeks advice from five colleagues to determine which 
methodology is used to assess impairment on other clients within the industry. 
Colleagues’ advice is presented in the form of notes that the auditor in the case took 
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during his consultation with colleagues (See Appendix A for a copy of the notes). Each 
piece of advice includes a brief description of the colleague’s client and whether the 
client’s reporting unit with goodwill is classified as an operating or financing company. 
Importantly, the colleagues’ clients are not comparable to the client of the consulting 
auditor on aspects that the specialist indicates are relevant to the operating/financing 
assessment. For example, though the client of the first colleague is also a railcar leasing 
company, the colleague’s client only offers full service leases. As such, the colleague’s 
client is significantly more involved with the leased assets, which makes the operating 
company classification more appropriate for that company. These distinguishing factors 
decrease the relevance of the colleagues’ advice to the consulting auditor’s assessment 
of the client-preferred methodology. 
I pilot tested the experimental materials with undergraduate and doctoral students 
at a large public university. Personnel from the Big Four firm that provided participants 
reviewed the case to ensure the task was appropriate for audit seniors and that 
terminology was firm specific. I randomly assigned participants to the four between-
participant treatments discussed in the following section. At the beginning of the 
experimental session, a proctor read a script that briefly described the participant’s task 
and distributed envelopes with instructions, the informed consent, two packets of case 
materials, and a packet of debriefing questions including experimental checks and 
demographic questions. The proctor monitored the experiment and collected the 
envelopes as participants finished. Participants completed the materials in about 30-45 
minutes. 
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Manipulated Factors and Response Variables 
To test my hypotheses, I manipulate two factors between participants using a 2 x 
2 research design. The first manipulated factor is the level of consensus in colleagues’ 
advice (‘Consensus’). Half the participants receive consistent advice indicating that all 
five of the colleagues’ clients were classified as operating companies, and that the clients 
used unlevered discounted cash flows in their impairment analyses. The remaining 
participants receive mixed advice indicating that two of the five colleagues’ clients were 
classified as financing companies, and that these clients used levered discounted cash 
flows in their impairment analyses.
 
The two clients that are classified as financing 
companies in the mixed advice treatment are identical to the operating companies that 
they replaced in the consistent advice treatment. As shown in Appendix A, I only change 
two words in the description of each client to indicate that they are “financing” (instead 
of “operating”) companies that used “levered” (instead of “unlevered”) discounted cash 
flows in their impairment analyses. All other information about the colleagues’ clients 
remains consistent across treatments.
8
 
I also manipulate when the specialist’s advice is received in relation to 
colleagues’ advice across two assessments of the client (‘Timing’). Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the experimental design. H1 and H2 predict that auditors evaluate the 
specialist’s advice differently based on the level of consensus in colleagues’ advice and 
whether the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as (with) colleagues’ advice, 
                                                          
8
 Each of these companies has leasing activity that is consistent with a financing company since they are 
not actively involved with the leased assets. However, each company also earns a substantial portion of 
their revenue from other operating-type activities.  
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or separately after evaluating colleagues’ advice. To test these hypotheses, I ask 
participants to evaluate the client’s position immediately following receipt of colleagues’ 
advice (the first assessment), and at the end of the case (the second assessment).
9
 Half 
the participants receive the specialist’s advice immediately preceding colleagues’ advice 
(Figure 1 Panel A). For participants in this treatment, the specialist’s advice is evaluated 
at the same time as colleagues’ advice during the first assessment. I use these 
participants’ responses to test H1. The remaining participants receive the specialist’s 
advice after making a first assessment using only colleagues’ advice. For participants in 
this treatment, the specialist’s advice is evaluated separately during the second 
assessment (Figure 1 Panel B). I use these participants’ responses to test H2. 
During each assessment, I ask participants to evaluate whether the auditor in the 
case should conclude that the client is an operating company. This judgment determines 
whether the client’s valuation methodology is appropriate, and whether the client’s 
goodwill is potentially impaired. Responses are measured on 11-point scales with 
anchors of ‘No’ (0) and ‘Yes’ (10). Following the first assessment, I ask participants 
how certain they are of the assessment just made about the client, measured with scale 
anchors of ‘Not Certain’ (0) and ‘Very Certain’ (10). In the debriefing questions, I ask 
participants to indicate how influential the client’s assessment was on their evaluation of 
whether the client was an operating company, measured with scale anchors of ‘Not 
Influential’ (0) and ‘Very Influential’ (10). 
                                                          
9
 I control participants’ access to advice at each assessment by separating the case into two packets. For all 
treatments, the specialist approves the client’s assumptions (e.g. the discount rate) in the second packet. 
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Figure 1. Experimental Design 
 
Panel A. Specialist’s advice evaluated at the same time as colleagues’ advice 
 
                Packet 1                   Packet 2 
 
Panel B. Specialist’s advice evaluated separately after colleagues’ advice 
 
                Packet 1                      Packet 2 
 
 
 
At both assessments, participants evaluate whether the auditor in the case should conclude that the client is an operating company. This judgment 
determines whether the client’s valuation methodology is appropriate, and ultimately whether the client’s goodwill is potentially impaired. 
 
a 
= The specialist’s advice indicates that the client is a financing company and that the client’s goodwill is potentially impaired. 
 
b
 = Colleagues’ advice provides either a consistent or mixed indication of whether the client-preferred operating-company valuation methodology is 
used on their clients. Under the operating-company methodology, the client’s goodwill is not impaired. 
Specialist’s 
advice on 
methodology 
received
 a 
Colleagues’ 
advice on 
methodology 
received
 b 
Auditor’s 
first 
assessment 
Auditor’s 
second 
assessment 
Specialist 
approves 
client’s 
assumptions 
Potential 
methodologies 
explained and 
client preference 
received 
Colleagues’ 
advice on 
methodology 
received
 b 
Auditor’s 
first 
assessment 
Auditor’s 
second 
assessment 
Specialist 
approves 
client’s 
assumptions 
Potential 
methodologies 
explained and 
client preference 
received 
Specialist’s 
advice on 
methodology 
received
 a 
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RESULTS 
 
 Table 1 presents the participant profile. After eliminating four participants who 
did not complete the case, the final sample includes 103 auditors. The auditors 
participating in the study averaged 2.6 years of audit experience and worked on about 
four clients annually. These auditors reported involvement with specialists on about 
seven audits, and that they sought advice from colleagues on about seven audits. 
Auditors indicated that they had performed audit procedures to test goodwill for 
impairment on about two audits. They assessed moderate familiarity with testing a 
client’s goodwill for impairment, rating familiarity at 5.09 on an 11-point scale with 
anchors of ‘Not Familiar’ (0) and ‘Very Familiar’ (10).10 However, auditors assessed 
understanding of the case materials relatively high, 7.47 on an 11-point scale with 
anchors of ‘Not Well’ (0) and ‘Very Well’ (10). None of the auditor demographics or 
assessments differ across treatment groups (p > 0.10). It appears that auditors 
participating in this study had experience evaluating advice from specialists and 
colleagues. Further, they appear to have understood the case materials.
                                                          
10
 This mid-scale rating is consistent with concerns identified in practitioner interviews that some auditors 
have only limited knowledge of the professional guidance and valuation methodologies required to audit 
significant accounting estimates (Griffith et al. 2013). No specific knowledge of professional guidance or 
valuation methodologies was required to complete the case.  
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Table 1. Participant Profile 
 
Number of auditor participants 
a
 103  
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Months of audit experience 31.66 12.07 
Number of audit clients per year 4.25 1.93 
Number of audits involving a specialist 6.64 3.11 
Number of times sought advice from colleagues 7.24 3.03 
Number of times involved with testing goodwill for impairment 1.83 1.75 
Familiarity with testing goodwill for impairment 5.09 2.60 
Understanding of case materials 7.47 1.71 
 
 
Self-assessments are made on 11-point scales with 10 (0) representing a high (low) level of familiarity and 
understanding. 
 
a
 = Auditor demographics and self-assessments do not vary across treatments (p > 0.10). 
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Experimental checks are assessed using 11-point scales with anchors of ‘No’ (0) 
and ‘Yes’ (10). For the consistent versus mixed advice manipulation check, I ask 
participants to evaluate whether all five of the consulting auditor’s colleagues indicated 
that their clients are classified as operating companies. Average responses are 8.88 and 
1.16 on the correct ends of the scale for participants in the consistent and mixed advice 
treatments, respectively (p < 0.01). I also ask participants to evaluate whether the 
materials indicated that the client’s goodwill would not be impaired if the client was 
classified as an operating company, but that it would be potentially impaired if the client 
was classified as a financing company. An average response of 9.52, that did not vary 
across treatment groups (p = 0.57), confirms that participants understood the implication 
of the operating versus financing classification. Auditors participating in this study 
recognized the manipulation and understood the key facet of the experimental task. 
Hypothesis Tests 
 H1 predicts that, when the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as 
colleagues’ advice, auditors are less likely to rely on specialist’s advice that differs from 
colleagues’ advice as the level of consensus increases in colleagues’ advice. I test my 
hypotheses using planned contrasts from a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).
11
 As hypothesized, I find that auditors are less likely to assess the client’s 
position in a manner consistent with the specialist’s advice when auditors evaluate the 
                                                          
11
 For completeness, the repeated measures ANOVA results are presented in Table 3. I rely on planned 
contrasts to test my hypotheses, because traditional ANOVA allocates much of the variance to the main 
effects and disordinal (cross-over) interactions across the two between-participant factors and the repeated 
measure (Howell 2010). As such, contrast coding provides greater statistical power to test the 
hypothesized effects (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). 
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specialist’s advice at the same time as colleagues’ advice that consistently supports an 
alternate position. This finding holds across both the first and second assessments (5.33, 
5.17 versus 3.73, 3.92, one-tailed p = 0.03, Table 2).
12
 In support of H1, I find that 
auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same time as colleagues’ advice are less 
likely to rely on specialist’s advice that differs from consistent advice received from 
colleagues. 
H2 predicts that, when the specialist’s advice is separately evaluated after 
colleagues’ advice, auditors are more likely to rely on the specialist’s advice regardless 
of the level of consensus in colleagues’ advice. I find that when auditors evaluate 
colleagues’ advice and then separately evaluate the specialist’s advice, they significantly 
change their first assessments and respond in a manner consistent with the specialist’s 
advice during the second assessment (6.41, 5.57 versus 4.11, 3.69, one-tailed p < 0.01, 
Table 2).
13
 In support of H2, I find that auditors are more likely to rely on the specialist’s 
advice, regardless of whether receiving consistent or mixed advice from colleagues, 
when the specialist’s advice is evaluated separately after first making an assessment 
based on colleagues’ advice. 
                                                          
12
 I observe no difference in variation between the two levels of consensus in colleagues’ advice across the 
first and second assessments (5.33 – 3.73 versus 5.17 – 3.92, two-tailed p = 0.61, untabulated). No 
evidence exists that these auditors revised their first assessments when making their second assessments.  
 
13
 I observe no difference in variation between the first and second assessments across the two level of 
consensus in colleagues’ advice (6.41 – 4.11 versus 5.57 – 3.69, two tailed p = 0.55, untabulated). No 
evidence exists that the receipt of consistent versus mixed colleagues’ advice affected these auditors’ 
revisions to their first assessments.  
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Table 2. Auditor Reliance on Specialist and Colleague Advice 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Specialist’s Advice  
With  
Colleagues’ Advice 
 Specialist’s Advice  
After  
Colleagues’ Advice 
  
First Assessment 
 
 
 
Specialist’s Advice & 
Colleagues’ Advice 
 
Colleagues’ Advice 
 
Consistent 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
5.33  6.41 
(3.02)  (2.50) 
n = 24  n = 27 
Mixed 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
3.73  5.57 
(3.09)  (3.15) 
n = 26  n = 26 
   
Second Assessment 
  
 No New Advice  Specialist’s Advice 
 
Consistent 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
5.17  4.11 
(3.19)  (2.33) 
n = 24  n = 27 
Mixed 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
3.92  3.69 
(3.02)  (3.07) 
n = 26  n = 26 
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Table 2. continued 
 
Panel B. Planned contrasts 
a 
 
   t-stat Sig. 
H1 (µc,w,1 + µc,w,2) –  
(µm,w,1 + µm,w,2) 
(5.33 + 5.17) –  
(3.73 + 3.92) 
1.90 0.03** 
H2 (µc,a,1 + µm,a,1) –  
(µc,a,2 + µm,a,2) 
(6.41 + 5.57) –  
(4.11 + 3.69) 
6.11 <0.01*** 
– (µc,w,1 + µc,a,1 + µm,a,1) –  
3 x µm,w,1 
(5.33 + 6.41 + 5.57) –  
3 x 3.73 
3.07 <0.01*** 
– (µc,a,2 + µm,a,2 + µm,w,2) – 
3 x µc,w,2 
(4.11 + 3.69 + 3.92) –  
3 x 5.17 
1.84 0.03** 
 
 
Mean (standard deviation) reported for auditors’ two assessments of whether the client is an operating 
company (goodwill is not potentially impaired), measured on an 11-point scale anchored by ‘No’ (0) and 
‘Yes’ (10). The specialist’s advice indicates that the client is a financing company (goodwill is potentially 
impaired). Colleagues’ advice provides either a consistent or mixed indication that the client is an 
operating company (goodwill is not impaired). The specialist’s advice is evaluated either at the same time 
as (with) colleagues’ advice, or separately after first making an assessment using only colleagues’ advice. 
 
a
 = Planned contrasts from a repeated measures ANOVA are used to test hypotheses and validate theory. 
µC,T,A denotes the cells used in the planned contrasts. C indicates whether the auditor received consistent 
(c) or mixed (m) colleagues’ advice, T indicates whether the auditor evaluated the specialist’s advice with 
(w) or after (a) colleagues’ advice, and A indicates responses to the first (1) or second (2) assessment. Due 
to the directional nature of the hypotheses, *, **, *** denotes one-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.    
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Table 3. Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
 
Source 
a
 MS df F-stat Sig. 
Between-Subjects Effects     
Consensus 53.89 1 3.84 0.05* 
Timing 8.58 1 0.61 0.44 
Consensus*Timing 8.19 1 0.58 0.45 
Residual 14.04 99   
     
Within-Subjects Effects     
Assessment 55.47 1 17.90 <0.01*** 
Assessment*Consensus 1.91 1 0.62 0.43 
Assessment*Timing 56.85 1 18.34 <0.01*** 
Assessment*Consensus*Timing 0.01 1 0.00 0.96 
Residual 3.01 99   
 
 
Responses from participants’ two assessments of whether the client is an operating company (goodwill is not 
potentially impaired) are analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA. *, **, *** denotes two-tailed 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
   
a
 = ‘Consensus’ is a variable indicating whether the participant received consistent or mixed advice from 
colleagues. ‘Timing’ is a variable indicating whether the participant evaluated the specialist’s advice at the 
same time as (with) or separately after colleagues’ advice. ‘Assessment,’ the repeated measure, denotes 
each of the two participant assessments.  
 
Refer to Table 2 for additional information on the two between-subjects manipulations and the repeated 
measure. 
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Verification of Theory 
 The theory underlying H1 predicts that, when both the specialist’s advice and 
colleagues’ advice is evaluated at the same time, auditors discount the specialist’s advice 
if it conflicts with advice from colleagues that consistently supports an alternate position. 
I expect an ordinal interaction in the auditors’ first assessments if the specialist’s advice 
is discounted. Auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same time as consistent 
advice from colleagues should respond similarly to auditors evaluating only colleagues’ 
advice. However, these auditors’ assessments should differ from those of auditors 
evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same time as mixed advice from colleagues. 
Participant responses from the auditors’ first assessment support this expectation (Figure 
2 Panel A and Table 2 Panel A). Auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same 
time as consistent colleagues’ advice and auditors evaluating only colleagues’ advice 
make assessments that differ from auditors who evaluate the specialist’s advice at the 
same time as mixed colleagues’ advice (5.33, 6.41, 5.47 versus 3.73, one-tailed p < 0.01; 
Table 2 Panel B).
14
 As theorized, when the specialist’s advice conflicts with consistent 
colleagues’ advice, auditors discount the specialist’s advice if they evaluate both sources 
of advice at the same time.
                                                          
14
 I observe no difference across the assessments of auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same 
time as consistent colleagues’ advice and auditors evaluating only colleagues’ advice (5.33, 6.41, 5.57, 
two-tailed p = 0.38, untabulated). 
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Figure 2. Auditor Reliance on Specialist and Colleague Advice 
 
Panel A. Auditor’s first assessment 
 
 
Panel B. Auditor’s second assessment 
 
 
 
 
Participants make two assessments of whether the auditor in the case should conclude that the client is an 
operating company (goodwill is not potentially impaired), measured on an 11-point scale anchored by 
‘No’ (0) and ‘Yes’ (10). The specialist’s advice is evaluated during the first assessment at the same time as 
colleagues’ advice, or separately during the second assessment after first making an assessment using only 
colleagues’ advice. Figure 1 provides an overview of the experimental design. Refer to Table 2 for 
descriptive statistics of participant responses at each assessment.
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H2 predicts that separating the auditor’s evaluation of the specialist’s advice and 
colleagues’ advice mitigates the discounting of the specialist’s advice observed when 
auditors evaluate the specialist’s advice at the same time as advice from colleagues that 
consistently supports an alternate position. I expect a different ordinal interaction in the 
auditors’ second assessments if discounting of the specialist’s advice is mitigated. 
Auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice separately after colleagues’ advice should 
respond similarly to auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same time as mixed 
advice from colleagues. However, these auditors’ assessments should differ from those 
of auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same time as consistent advice from 
colleagues. Participant responses from the auditors’ second assessment support this 
expectation (Figure 2 Panel B and Table 2 Panel A). Auditors evaluating the specialist’s 
advice separately after either consistent or mixed advice from colleagues and auditors 
who evaluate the specialist’s advice at the same time as mixed advice from colleagues 
make assessments that differ from auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same 
time as consistent advice from colleagues (4.11, 3.69, 3.92 versus 5.17, one-tailed p = 
0.03, Table 2 Panel B).
15
 As theorized, evaluating the specialist’s advice separately after 
colleagues’ advice mitigates the discounting of the specialist’s advice. 
  
                                                          
15
 I observe no difference across the assessments of auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice separately 
after colleagues’ advice and auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same time as mixed 
colleagues’ advice (4.11, 3.69, 3.92, two-tailed p = 0.86, untabulated). 
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Robustness Checks 
Prior research suggests that auditors are less likely to rely on advice when the 
advice contradicts a client-preferred position, and when they are more confident in their 
initial assessment (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Yaniv and Milyavsky 2007; Ng and 
Shankar 2010). As such, auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice at the same time as 
consistent advice received from colleagues may discount the specialist’s advice to curry 
favor with management. Further, auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice separately 
after colleagues’ advice may revise their first assessment because they were not 
confident in their initial assessment. To rule out these alternative explanations, I ask 
participants to assess the importance of the client’s preference on their evaluation of 
whether the client is an operating company, and how confident they were in their initial 
assessment. I find no significant differences across treatment groups for either measure 
(p > 0.10, Table 4) and including the measures as covariates does not change the 
tabulated results. Neither client-preference nor auditor confidence appear to explain the 
hypothesized findings.
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Table 4. Assessments of Certainty and Client Preference 
 
Panel A. Certainty in first assessment  
 
 
Specialist’s Advice  
With  
Colleagues’ Advice 
Specialist’s Advice  
After  
Colleagues’ Advice 
 
Consistent 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
6.12 6.63 
(2.38) (2.26) 
n = 24 n = 27 
Mixed 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
6.38 7.00 
(2.42) (2.26) 
n = 26 n = 26 
 
 MS df F-stat Sig. 
Consensus 2.55 1 0.47 0.49 
Timing 8.06 1 1.49 0.23 
Consensus*Timing 0.08 1 0.01 0.90 
Residual 5.42 99   
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Table 4. continued 
 
Panel B. Influence of client preference 
 
 
Specialist’s Advice  
With  
Colleagues’ Advice 
Specialist’s Advice  
After  
Colleagues’ Advice 
 
Consistent 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
4.38 3.85 
(2.84) (2.78) 
n = 24 n = 27 
Mixed 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
4.39 5.19 
(2.61) (2.80) 
n = 26 n = 26 
 
 MS df F-stat Sig. 
Consensus 11.71 1 1.54 0.21 
Timing 0.52 1 0.07 0.79 
Consensus*Timing 11.38 1 1.50 0.22 
Residual 7.61 99   
 
 
After the first assessment, participants evaluated how certain they were in the assessment just made about 
the client, measured on an 11-point scale anchored by ‘Not Certain’ (0) and ‘Very Certain’ (10). At the 
end of the case, participants evaluated how influential the client’s assessment was on their evaluation of 
whether the client was an operating company, measured on an 11-point scale anchored by ‘Not Influential’ 
(0) and ‘Very Influential’ (10). Participant responses are analyzed using ANOVA. *, **, *** denotes two-
tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Between-participant manipulations are 
defined in Table 3. 
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Additional Tests of Advice Utilization 
My primary analysis indicates that auditors are more likely to rely on the 
specialist’s advice when it is evaluated separately after evaluating colleagues’ advice. 
This setting occurs naturally in the audit environment when the specialist raises concerns 
early in the audit process but does not conclude on the issue until completing his or her 
review of the client’s analysis. Though I theorize that these results are attributable to a 
shift in focus from consensus to the relevance of advice, one may argue that auditors 
evaluating the specialist’s advice after colleagues’ advice placed greater reliance on the 
last piece of advice received, a recency phenomenon. In addition, this design choice 
imposes a constraint on the timing of when the specialist’s advice is received that is 
beyond the control of the auditor. 
To address these concerns, I conduct a second experiment using 117 graduate 
students enrolled at a large public university. Their average age was 22, all had taken at 
least one auditing class, and about 94% of them had been on an audit internship. I 
employ a 3 x 1 experimental design in which participants evaluate the specialist’s advice 
before, at the same time as, or after the consistent advice from colleagues that conflicts 
with the specialist’s advice. For this analysis, I am primarily concerned with 
participants’ second assessments, which are made with the knowledge of both the 
specialist’s advice and colleagues’ advice. The responses of participants evaluating the 
specialist’s advice at the same time as and after colleagues’ advice replicate the findings 
in my primary analysis (6.63 vs. 4.87, one-tailed p < 0.01, Table 5). I also find that 
participants evaluating the specialist’s advice separately before colleagues’ advice are 
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more likely to rely on the specialist’s advice than are participants evaluating the 
specialist’s advice at the same time as colleagues’ advice (5.46 vs. 6.63, one-tailed p = 
0.03, Table 5). Further, I observe no significant difference across the responses of 
auditors evaluating the specialist’s advice before or after colleagues’ advice (5.46 vs. 
4.87 two-tailed p = 0.35, untabulated). I do observe that participants who evaluate the 
specialist’s advice separately before colleagues’ advice significantly revise their first 
assessments upon receipt of advice from colleagues that consistently supports an 
alternate position (2.92 vs. 5.46, two-tailed p < 0.01, untabulated). Regardless of whether 
the change is due to recency or the perceived relevance of the colleagues’ advice, these 
participants’ second assessments are more consistent with the specialist’s advice than 
those of participants who evaluated both sources of advice at the same time, and are not 
statistically different from those of participants who evaluated the specialist’s advice 
separately after colleagues’ advice. Consistent with my theory, these results suggest that 
auditors are more likely to rely on the specialist’s advice when it is evaluated separately, 
regardless of whether it is received before or after colleagues’ advice.
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Table 5. Additional Tests of Advice Utilization 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Specialist’s Advice  
Before  
Colleagues’ Advice 
 Specialist’s Advice  
With  
Colleagues’ Advice 
 Specialist’s Advice  
After  
Colleagues’ Advice 
      
First Assessment 
 
    
 
Specialist’s Advice 
 Specialist’s Advice & 
Colleagues’ Advice 
 
Colleagues’ Advice 
 
Consistent 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
2.92  6.18  7.03 
(2.37)  (2.53)  (2.93) 
n = 39  n = 38  n = 39 
      
Second Assessment 
 
  
  
 Colleagues’ Advice  No New Advice  Specialist’s Advice 
 
Consistent 
Colleagues’ 
Advice  
5.46  6.63  4.87 
(3.21)  (2.33)  (3.08) 
n = 39  n = 38  n = 39 
 
Panel B. Planned contrasts 
a 
 
  t-stat Sig. 
µw,2 – µa,2 6.63 – 4.87 2.79 <0.01*** 
µb,2 – µw,2 5.46 – 6.63 1.86 0.03** 
 
 
Mean (standard deviation) reported for auditors’ two assessments of whether the client is an operating 
company (goodwill is not impaired), measured on an 11-point scale anchored by ‘No’ (0) and ‘Yes’ (10). 
The specialist’s advice indicates that the client is a financing company (goodwill is potentially impaired). 
Colleagues’ advice provides a consistent indication that the client is an operating company (goodwill is 
not potentially impaired). The specialist’s advice is evaluated separately before colleagues’ advice, at the 
same time as (with) colleagues’ advice, or separately after colleagues’ advice. 
 
a
 = Planned contrasts from a repeated measures ANOVA are used to validate theory. µT,A denotes the cells 
used in the planned contrasts. T indicates whether the auditor evaluated the specialist’s advice before (b), 
with (w), or after (a) colleagues’ advice. A indicates responses to the first (1) or second (2) assessment. 
Due to the directional nature of the hypotheses, *, **, *** denotes one-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 I examine how the evaluation of advice received from a specialist and colleagues 
affects an auditor’s professional judgment. Consistent with application of the “consensus 
implies correctness” heuristic, I find that auditors discount a specialist’s advice when it 
is evaluated at the same time as advice from colleagues that consistently supports an 
alternative position. In doing so, these auditors respond similarly to auditors who only 
evaluate advice from colleagues. Importantly, the experiences on which the colleagues’ 
advice is based are with clients that are not comparable to the client of the consulting 
auditor. As such, these auditors place greater reliance on irrelevant advice from 
colleagues than on advice received from the firm’s designated subject-matter expert. 
This finding is troublesome given the PCAOB’s expectation that auditors should rely on 
advice received from a specialist “unless the auditor's procedures lead him or her to 
believe the findings are unreasonable in the circumstances” (PCAOB 2003 ¶12). 
 I also examine whether separating the auditor’s evaluation of the specialist’s 
advice and colleagues’ advice increases reliance on the specialist’s advice. I theorize that 
auditors will evaluate advice based on relevance, rather than consensus, when the 
specialist’s advice is evaluated separately from colleagues’ advice. I find that auditors 
who evaluate the specialist’s advice separately after colleagues’ advice significantly 
change their initial assessments. These auditors rely on the specialist’s advice regardless 
of the level of consensus in advice received from colleagues. In a second experiment, I 
provide evidence that reliance on the specialist’s advice is also higher when the 
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specialist’s advice is evaluated separately before colleagues’ advice. In sum, evaluating 
the specialist’s advice separately mitigates the observed discounting of the specialist’s 
advice that can occur when the specialist’s advice is evaluated at the same time as 
colleagues’ advice.    
My study is subject to several limitations. First, the participants in the study are 
audit seniors from one Big Four public accounting firm, so my results are specific to 
audit seniors and potentially specific to the firm that provided the participants. In 
addition, practitioners describe an iterative consultation process in which there are 
numerous discussions between the specialist and the audit team (Griffith 2013). These 
discussions are necessarily restricted in this study due to time limits on access to 
participants. Finally, my case materials involve the evaluation of consultation advice 
related to a client’s goodwill impairment analysis. My results may not generalize to 
consultation advice received on other matters, such as on the acceptability of a client’s 
accounting policy. I encourage future research to examine the auditor’s evaluation of a 
specialist’s advice and colleagues’ advice in other types of consultation. 
I also note that audit partners and managers are heavily involved in the audit of 
significant accounting estimates. As such, the audit senior's assessment made in the case 
would be subject to review by other members of the audit team. I do not capture these 
effects of the audit team environment. However, audit seniors’ initial judgments have 
been shown to influence reviewing auditors’ judgments (Ricchiute 1999). Further, 
interviews with practitioners confirm that seniors are typically the primary point of 
contact between the specialist and the audit team, and that these seniors are actively 
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involved in the decision-making process when a specialist is used to audit an accounting 
estimate. Future research could examine how other members of the audit team evaluate 
consultation advice received from a specialist and colleagues. 
 Consultation is generally thought to improve professional judgment through the 
sharing of knowledge across audit professionals. I identify an unintended consequence 
of consultation with colleagues whereby auditors discount advice received from the 
firm’s specialist. This discounting undermines the resources that public accounting firms 
devote to providing the best advice through consultation with the firm’s designated 
subject-matter experts. My findings also provide a behavioral explanation for 
deficiencies reported by the PCAOB in which auditors discount specialist advice. 
However, I also identify a way to increase auditor reliance on specialist advice that 
mitigates the observed discounting by separating when the auditor evaluates the 
specialist’s advice and colleagues’ advice. As such, my study provides insight for public 
accounting firms and the PCAOB on how to improve the use of consultation resources 
and minimize consultation-related audit deficiencies.     
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APPENDIX A 
Colleagues’ Advice 
 
Chris Baltz – Rolling Stock audit 
All of Rolling Stock’s revenue is from long-term railcar leases. All leases are full service. 
Rolling Stock employs mechanics full-time in many rail yards across the US. 
Chris considers Rolling Stock’s reporting unit with goodwill to be an operating company. 
Rolling Stock used unlevered discounted cash flows in its goodwill impairment analysis. 
Eric Althoff – Airfreight audit   
About half of Airfreight’s revenue is from long-term cargo aircraft leases. No service option is available.  
A division performs maintenance for cargo planes, including some planes that Airfreight leases. 
Eric considers Airfreight’s reporting unit with goodwill to be an operating (a financing) company.  
Airfreight used unlevered (levered) discounted cash flows in its goodwill impairment analysis.  
Landon Moore – Trailer Co. audit  
Most of Trailer’s revenue is from long-term 18-wheeler cargo trailer leases. Two-thirds are full service. 
Trailer employs many mechanics in garages across the US interstate system. 
Landon considers Trailer’s reporting unit with goodwill to be an operating company.  
Trailer used unlevered discounted cash flows in its goodwill impairment analysis. 
Jeremiah Schulte – Seabox audit 
Half of Seabox’s revenue is from long-term sea container leases. Containers require minimal service. 
A division performs warehouse and loading/unloading services at a large port on the Atlantic seaboard. 
Jeremiah considers Seabox’s reporting unit with goodwill to be an operating (a financing) company.  
Seabox used unlevered (levered) discounted cash flows in its goodwill impairment analysis.  
Dan Finn – Track, Inc. audit 
Two-thirds of Track’s revenue comes from long-term rail car leases. Half are full service. 
Track employs mechanics full-time in major rail yards across the US, and rebuilds third-party railcars. 
Dan considers Track’s reporting unit with goodwill to be an operating company.  
Track used unlevered discounted cash flows in its goodwill impairment analysis. 
 
 
Participants receiving consistent (mixed) advice from colleagues were told that the second and fourth 
colleagues indicated that their client’s reporting unit with goodwill was classified as an operating 
(financing) company, and that an unlevered (levered) discounted cash flow approach was used in the 
goodwill impairment analysis.  
